Military Power of the Roman Army

Military Power of the popish ArmyOCdt A. Lopez-Espinosa maven of the virtually iconic images of the papist Empire is that of the roman type pass a visual representation of the Empires power and its willingness to exercise it. Curiously, the popular image of the papist soldier is not entirely accurate, in that the idealized image that more or less hold is singular and constant in nature, yet the papist ground forces was anything but, undergoing many changes in equipment and composition throughout the reign of ancient Rome. In fact, few things remained the same as the years went on save for the roman type armys tradition of suss out and order, the padion of new tactics and organizational structures was a defining feature of the roman soldiers, and here lies the source of the roman type armys superiority.1 The papist armys power came from its adaptability, which allowed it to react to new challenges presented by opponents, and from its tradition of harsh elucidate, which resulted in better trained forces with increased tactical and strategic capabilities. The effects of these factors plunder be seen in the many inclines in which Romes forces participated, with the papisticals adapting their equipment, tactics, and formations, and adopting those of its enemies, along with their commodious discipline existence important contributors to their success.2In Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and Their Decline, Montesquieu states that, the circumstance which contributed approximately to render the Romans masters of the world was, that having contended successively against all nations, they invariably renounced their experience usages as soon as they found better (20), thus effectively identifying one of the Roman armys primary sources of power.3Unlike many of the armies of the season, the Romans had no qualms some changing their protest practices in order to more effectively engagement an foeman, or to even adopt those of other nations that they deemed to be effective. This made it so that the Roman army became not just more experienced with all(prenominal) encounter, but better in any number of practical ways, with changes to their own methods and adoption of enemy tactics and equipment. Ultimately, the Romans military might was so bully because it was composed of the strengths of eery nation they had defeated. This virtue of adaptability was seen in some of its soonest examples with Romulus adopting the Sabines buckler, which was larger and thereof provided more protection than the Argive buckler that he previously used.4 While to the modern reader this may seem far outdoor(a) from a revolutionary idea, it was at the time, and as such conceded an exceptional utility to the Romans. As remarked by Montesquieu and translated in A Treatise on the Science of state of war and fortress, It is remarkable, that the nations vanquished by the Romans never inquired into the causes of their repeate d defeats but persevered in the use of their weapons and institutions to the plump moment of their political existence (OConnor, 71).5 Clearly, this doctrine of assimilation and adjustment was moderately unique for its time, and thereby allowed the Roman Legions to continuously evolve, with new tactics, equipment, and training.An even greater testament to the adaptability of the Romans was that they did not except assimilate or adapt to the innovations of the armies after(prenominal) having defeated them, but would do so throughout a campaign as well, learning from every defeat in order to in the end take victory back. A good example of this was upon encountering the elephants of Pyrrhus, where the unfamiliar animals routed the Roman cavalry, their horses, before they got approximate the animals, were terrified and ran away with their riders (Plutarch, XVII.3), but the Romans allowed this to happen only once.6 In response, they first supplied the weakness of their cavalry by taking away the bridles from the horses, and afterwards by mixing velites with their cavalry proper (Montesquieu, 55).7The Romans strategy of adaptation and adoption showed clear results on the battlefield time and time again. In this way, many a campaign that seemed lost at first was lastly reclaimed by them, careful to ascertain in what respects their enemy might possess some superiority over them they immediately took follow up accordingly (Montesquieu, 54), and thereby turn the tides in their favour once more.8 In short, a great factor in the Roman armys success was its doctrine of constant evolution if someone was doing something better, do what they are doing. In this way, the Roman army continuously evolved into a force that had the best traits of all powers in the area as summarized by Josephus If any nation enjoyed any ill-tempered advantage they at once availed themselves of the same. They did not neglect to provide themselves with Numidian horses, Cretan archers, Bal earic slingmen, and Rhodian ships. In fine, no nation ever prepared for war with so much prudence, or carried it on with so much audacity (Montesquieu, 56).9The Romans exercised other great advantage over their contemporaries discipline. Many of the armies of their time beingness composed of non-professional soldiers, and those that did have standing armies had them composed of barbarians and undisciplined military personnel. As such, it would a good deal come about that the Romans claimed victory despite being grossly outnumbered, Roman troops always being the better disciplined, it was likely, even in the most fatal combats, that they would rally in part, or that the enemy would somewhere be thrown into disorder and although overborne in the beginning , they finally wrested victory from their hands (Montesquieu, 54).10This great discipline was of the utmost importance to the Roman armys success, and so it was instilled from the moment that a man would enlist. They began tra ining at military schools, increasing physical strength, dexterity, and weapons handling, with the most famous of these being the Campus Martius in ancient Rome.11 All of this contributed to the Roman soldier becoming the best version of himself, which in turn resulted in a greater esprit de corps and overcharge, and ultimately a greater willingness to fight. This transferred directly to the battlefield, where the Roman forces would rarely break formation despite being presented with an overwhelming enemy, and whose formations were then powerful and resilient enough to overcome these same enemies. The discipline that Roman soldiers exhibited came from two factors, one being the risk of penalisation, and the other being Roman felicitate, with each being effective in their own right.The pride that Romans matte up in their place in the military was an effective component in maintaining order amongst the troops by being preventative a Roman soldier did not wish to forsake his duty because of his pride. This could be seen in the rarity of Roman desertions, which resulted from the fact that soldiers drawn from the bosom of a race so proud, so haughty, so confident of dominating other peoples, could little think so far undervaluing themselves as to cease to be Romans (Montesquieu, 53).12 This pride went beyond retention and increased morale and combat effectiveness, as this pride allowed a Roman soldier to believe in himself and his brothers in fortification all the more.13The other source of Roman military discipline cauline from the threat of punishment for those who were lacking. This began from the earliest days of a soldiers career when exertion was unsatisfactory they were punished accordingly, and so it became that corporal punishment to enforce discipline was part of a soldiers way of life (Saller, 136).14 Despite corporal punishment becoming the norm for these soldiers, there existed far more severe punishments that served as extreme deterrents for the most extreme cases of a soldiers misconduct, the most famous of these being the decimation of a unit. As describe by PolybiusIf the same thing ever happens to large bodies, and if entire maniples desert their posts when exceedingly hard pressed, the officers refrain from inflicting the pommel or the death penalty on all, but find a solution of the difficulty which is both salutary and terror-striking. The tribune assembles the legion, and brings up those guilty of sledding the ranks, reproaches them sharply, and finally chooses by grasss sometimes five, sometimes eight, sometimes cardinal of the offenders, so adjusting the number thus chosen that they form as near as possible the tenth part of those guilty of cowardice. Those on whom the lot falls are bastinadoed mercilessly in the manner above described the rest receive rations of barley instead of wheat and are tenacious to encamp outside the camp on an unprotected spot. As therefore the danger and dread of drawing the fa tal lot affects all equally, as it is uncertain on whom it will fall and as the public set down of receiving barley rations falls on all alike, this practice is that best deliberate to both inspire fear and to correct the mischief. (Polybius, 38)15This punishment is exemplary of the aline of consequences that could befall a soldier who lacked discipline if ones pride was not motivation enough, then these would be.Clearly, both methods of encouraging discipline amongst Roman troops were effective, and in turn this discipline was a powerful asset of the Roman army. The Roman armys unmatched discipline on the battlefield proved itself to be a source of strength and a great advantage time and time again. Especially against barbaric forces, even when outnumbered the Romans would hold, and the undisciplined enemy forces would be routed despite their numerical advantage, and they would thereby finally wrest victory from their hands (Montesquieu, 54).16The Roman Empires military might w as what allowed it to expand and maintain its power and influence, and so the Empire was only as strong as its army. The Roman armys power came from their willingness to adapt and their strict doctrine of discipline, and this is further apparent in how the armies of subsequent eras were eager to adopt these same ideals, and when doing so became far more successful.ReferencesGoldsworthy, Adrian. 2003. The Complete Roman Army. capital of the United Kingdom Thames and Hudson Ltd.Montesquieu, and Jehu Baker. 1882. Montesquieus Considerations on the Causes of the importance and Decadence of the Romans. New York D. Appleton and Company.OConnor, John M. 1817. A Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification. New York J. Seymour.Plutarch. n.d. Life of Pyrrhus.Polybius. n.d. Book 6.Saller, Richard P. 1997. Patriarchy, Property and finis in the Roman Family. Cambridge Cambridge University Press.1 Adrian Goldsworthy, The Complete Roman Army (London Thames and Hudson Ltd., 2003).2 Montesqui eu and Jehu Baker, Montesquieus Considerations on the Causes of the Grandeur and Decadence of the Romans (New York D. Appleton and Company, 1882), 54.3 Ibid, 20.4 Ibid, 20.5 John OConnor, A Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification (New York J. Seymour, 1817), 71.6 Plutarch, Life of Pyrrhus (n.d.), XVII.3.7 Montesquieu and Jehu Baker, Montesquieus Considerations on the Causes of the Grandeur and Decadence of the Romans (New York D. Appleton and Company, 1882), 55.8 Ibid, 54.9 Ibid, 56.10 Ibid, 54.11 Ibid, 49-51.12 Ibid, 53.13 Ibid, 53-54.14 Richard P. Saller, Patriarchy, Property and Death in the Roman Family (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1997), 136.15 Polybius, Book VI (n.d.), 38.16 Montesquieu and Jehu Baker, Montesquieus Considerations on the Causes of the Grandeur and Decadence of the Romans (New York D. Appleton and Company, 1882), 54.